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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Gratuities to Public Employees in Military
Service-In a suit to enjoin spending of public funds taxpayer challenged validity of state statute which provided for payments to dependents
of public employees serving in the armed forces.' Held, statute unconstitutional as violating the special privilege 2 and gratuity clauses 3 of the Pennsylvania constitution. Kurtz v. Pittsburgh et aL, 346 Pa. 362, 31 A. (2d)
257 (I943).

It is generally admitted that state and local governments can give
preference to war veterans in public employment, 4 and during the Civil
War their power to offer bounties for enlistment in the armed services
was likewise upheld.5 However, the instant statute is to be distinguished
from such laws in that the payment involved pertains to men in the service
rather than veterans and also in that it bears no relationship to whether
the man volunteered or was drafted. There appear to be two constitutional problems raised by such a statute. If the payments are regarded
as based on military service the question arises whether it violates the
principles of classification to make them payable only to public employees
and not to other citizens who are in the armed forces. The majority of

the Court held that the classification was based neither on necessity 8 nor
on substantial distinctions in the objects classified.7 When the same question was raised under a similar New York statute,8 the New York court 9
1. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1942) tit. 65, § 112. In substance the statute
provided that when employees of the state or its political subdivisions enter the Armed
Forces the dependent wives and children of such employees shall receive one-half of
their salary during the period of military service. It also provided for payments to
dependent parents.
2. PA. CONST. Art. III, § 7, provides that, "The General Assembly shall not pass
any local or special law:

. . . Granting to any

. . .

individual any special or

exclusive privilege or immunity..
3. See note ii, infra.
4. Cook v. Mason, IO3 Cal. App. 6, 283 Pac. 891 (x929) ; Com. ex rel. Graham
v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A. (2d) 7oi (1938) ; Note (1939) i2o A. L. R. 783.
5. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9 (1866); Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. 154
(1870) ; Speer v. School Directors of Blairsville, 5o Pa. i5o (i865). But cf. Amity
Township v. Reed, 62 Pa. 442 (I869). Such legislation was generally sustained on
the ground that the encouragement of enlistments benefited the community by helping
to relieve it from a possible draft. It is highly problematical that such acts would be
upheld today, for they would seem to be in direct violation of Section 7 of the 1940
Selective Service Act, 5o U. S. C. A. App. § 307 (Supp. I942).
6. Appeal of Ayars, x22 Pa. 266, I6 At. 356 (1889).
7. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (935) ; Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363
Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929 (936) ; Commonwealth v. Grossman, 248 Pa. II, 93 AtI.
781 (1915). The United States Supreme Court laid down the following test in the
Colgate case: "The classification in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition, must
be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones." 296 U. S. 404, 423.
8. The New York Military Law, § z45, as amended by c. 435 of the Laws of
1917, provided that state and city employees who were members of the National
Guard, members of the Reserve Corps, or members in the Federal 'military, naval, or
marine service and who were called to active duty should receive from the state or
city any difference between civil and military pay.
9. Henn v. City of Mount Vernon, I98 Atip. Div. 152, i89 N. Y. S. 85i (1921).
The New York law was tested under the equal protection clause of the Federal constitution, whereas the statute in the instant 6se was declared to violate the special
privilege clause of the state constitution. However, the similarity between, the two
types of constitutional provisions will be realized when one considers that "The one
prevents the curtailment of constitutional rights, the other prevents the enlargement
of the right . . . of others." Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind.
556, 56o, iO9 N. E. 2o6, 208 (91). The rights protected are really identical. Miles
v. Department of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, x89, 193 N. E. 855, 862 (935).
(102)
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concluded such classification was valid, saying that it was similar to preferring war veterans in public employment. The type of statute which
picks out one group of applicants for public jobs, namely those who are
war veterans, and proceeds to prefer them over the other applicants, does
not necessarily involve unreasonable classification because the preference
can be justified on the theory that military training and discipline are such
desirable qualities they deserve a preference. 10 But the type of statute
here involved is entirely different; it picks out one group of men who are
in military service, namely, those who were public employees. Such a
classification is not only devoid of reason but discriminates against other
citizens of the state who are also in the armed forces. If the payments are
considered a part of the employer-employee relationship rather than for
military service a different legal problem arises. The majority of the
Court was of the opinion that these payments were gratuitous in character
and hence in violation of the state constitution;I" in reaching that conclusion they distinguished them from pensions,' 2 sick leaves, and vacations. 13 The dissent on the other hand, regarded them as payments by
the state for obtaining "better performance of public duty, superior discipline, loyalty and public spirit." 14 Perhaps the latter argument would
have been more effective if the constitution had not been so explicit on the
subject and if the statute itself had required a minimum length of service,
as do most of the programs adopted by private industry.' 5 The result
accomplished by this decision would seem to be desirable; for this statute
was mandatory on local governments rather than permissive in character,
and consequently, with the growing number of public employees in the
armed services, the financial burden was becoming increasingly severe.
Constitutional Law-Power of School Board to Compel Pupils
to Salute Flag--The West Virginia Board of Education adopted a
resolution' requiring all pupils in all schools to salute the flag. Plaintiffs,
io. Com. ex reL Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A. (2d) 7O (1938).
II. PA. CONST. Art. III, § 18, provides: "No appropriations shall be made for
charitable, educational, or benevolent purposes to any person . . . Provided, That
appropriations may be made for pensions or gratuities for military services, to blind
persons

. . ., for assistance to mothers having dependent children, and to aged per-

sons without adequate means of support."
12. "'A pension is a bounty or a gratuity given for services that were rendered
in the past.' . . . Under the legislation now before us, length of service of the employee has no bearing whatever." Instant case at 374, 262.
13. "Vacations and sick leaves reasonable in length of time, without deduction of
pay, are now generally recognized as implied in contracts of public employment. If
vacation and sick leaves with pay were unreasonable they would justify the charge
that public funds were being illegally used in payment for services not performed."
Instant case at 377, 263.
14. Instant case at 400, 273. When it was challenged that the New York law
violated a somewhat similar gratuities clause in the New York constitution, the Court
of Appeals brushed the argument aside with the statement that the law "plainly invoked" Article V, § 6, of the state constitution. The latter section provides for a civil
service system based on merit and competitive examinations. Hoyt v. Broome Co.,285 N. Y. 402, 406, 34 N. E. (2d) 481, 482 (1941).
15. In a study by the National Industrial Conference Board it appeared that approximately four-fifths of the companies adopting such benefit programs require a
minimum length of service. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT No.
52 (March, 1943). It is interesting to note that Pennsylvania has specifically authorized such payments as within the power of corporations. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon)
tit. 15, §§ 2852-315.

I. Adopted under authority of W. VA.
man, Supp. 1941) § 1734.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, Sublett and Stech-
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members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" sect,2 whose beliefs forbid any

obeisance except to God, brought suit in the United States District Court,

asking for an injunction to restrain enforcement of this regulation against
"Jehovah's Witnesses." The injunction was granted" and an appeal taken
to the United States Supreme Court. Held, affimed. The compulsory
flag salute is a violation of the I4th Amendment,4 which, as a guarantee
of freedom of speech, is to be interpreted as imposing a limitation upon
the states equally specific to that imposed upon the nafional government
by the Ist Amendment." Minersville School District v. Gobitis' is overruled.7 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Stull and
McClure, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1943).
Whereas the court in the Gobitis case assumed power in the state to

compel the salute, and based its decision on a religious belief claimed as
an exception to the general rule, the majority of the court in overruling it
did not confine themselves to the question of freedom of religion but examined the question of the state's power in the matter and queried the right

of the state to force any citizen to observe the ceremony, stating that irrespective of religious views, it was any individual's right to refuse to salute
the flag 8 and any attempt to make him do so is to infringe upon the constitutional liberty of the individual. In so holding, the Supreme Court

took another step in a definite trend towards greater constitutional pro-

tection of civil nghts and personal liberties.0 This movement is notable
in a series of decisions involving "Jehovah's Witnesses." 10 The majority
2.

For an excellent discussion of the origins and beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses,
Am
CoMlsxx, Jehovah's Witnesses Mold Constitutional Law (1943) 2

see MuumaE

Bux or

RIGHTS REVIEw 262.

3.Barnette, Stull and McClure v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 47 F.
SUPP. 251 1942i~).
4. U. S. CONST. AmmD. XIV: "...
No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."
5.U. S. CONST. AMEND. I: "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
6. 31o U. S. 586 (x94o) ; (1938) U. oF PA. L. REv. 43I (discussion of the lower

court decision).
7. Justices Roberts and Reed dissented by merely stating that they adhered to the
views expressed by the Court in the Gobitis case, while Justice Frankfurter dissented
in an extensive opinion. Justices Black and Douglas wrote a brief concurring opinion
as an explanation of their change of view, since they had been among the majority in
the Gobilis case.
8. In this case the refusal to salute the flag was not due to any lack of genuine
patriotism.
9.See Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U. S.39o (1923) (Statute prohibiting
teaching in all schools of any language other than English is an unconstitutional interference with liberty of teaching) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.510 (x925)
(A state may not prohibit children from attending private and parochial schools);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S.359 (ig3i) (An ordinance prohibiting the display
of a red flag was held invalid); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) (Court held
that streets and parks could not be closed to public speakers) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S.147 (I939) (A city ordinance preventing the distribution of literature
on public streets was held invalid).
io. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S.444 (938) ; Schneider v. State, '3o8 U. S.
147 (x939) ; Cantwell et al. v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.296 (94o) ; Cox et al. v. New
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (ig4i) ; Leiby et al. v. City of Manchester, 33 F. Supp. 842
(1940) ; Borchert v. City of Ranger, Texas, 42 F. Supp. 577 (i94); Hannon v. Haverinl, i2o F. (2ad) 87 (C. C. A. ist, I94x); City of Blue Island v. Kozu, 379 Ill. 511,
41 N. E. (2d) 5x5; McConkey et al. v. City of Fredricksburg, 179 Va. 556, ig S. E.

(2d) 682.
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of these decisions outlawed local ordinances restricting local activities of
the members of this sect. In a most recent case, 1 the Supreme Court has
outlawed ordinances which required members of the sect to purchase
licenses in order to distribute literature while disseminating their religious
beliefs. The position taken by the court in the protection of civil liberties
is in interesting contrast to the views it has been expressing when the
issue was the invasion of property rights. In the latter situation the
majority have been insisting that state legislation must not be held invalid
unless so arbitrary as to be without rational foundation. Thus, property
rights may be infringed if, in the opinion of the court, a majority or substantial number of men have rationally reached the conclusion that the
public interest requires such action. But, according to the majority of the
court in the instant case, this is not true of civil liberties, such as freedom
of speech. Mr. Justice Jackson, in writing the opinion for the court,
expresses this thought as follows: "The right of a State to regulate, for
example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test
is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature
may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of
press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect. ... ,"12 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is
.devoted largely to the argument that the view of the majority is unsound
in drawing a distinction between the scope of the protection accorded
property rights and that given civil liberties. The dissenting Justice believes that the issue in both cases is whether or not the challenged legislation can be regarded as reasonable or completely arbitrary. Thus, the
cleavage between the views of the majority and dissenting opinions raises
a fundamental constitutional issue, which in importance goes far beyond
the significance of whether or not school children shall be compelled to
salute the flag. Future decisions of the court in the field of civil liberties
will be closely watched by all those interested in the trend which the court
will take on this important question.

Descent and Distribution-Intestacy-An Heir Cannot Destroy
the Lien of His Judgment Creditor by Renunciation of the Inheritance-Defendant had a judgment against M, who later inherited a
one-twelfth interest in certain real estate. She executed a writing purportedly renouncing her interest before the estate had been distributed.
Then all the other heirs gave the plaintiff a quit-claim deed to the property. Execution and levy was then made on the one-twelfth interest and
plaintiff sued for an injunction against this suit. Held, denied; the judgment lien was not destroyed by the attempted renunciation; 1 plaintiff did
not take title to M's one-twelfth interest. Coomes v. Finegan, 7 N. W.
(2d) 729 (1943).

ii. Jones v.Opelika, 316 U.S.584 (1943).

12. Instant case at 186.
. IOwA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) § 11,602, provides that all judgments obtained
within the state are liens upon all real estate the debtor "may subsequently acquire, for
the period of ten years from the date of the judgment."

io6
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Some writers have stated that under the common law estates by
intestacy could not be renounced. 2 As a matter of fact the early writers
did not touch on the problem in that form. They did say, however, that
title under intestacy passed at the moment of the intestate's death.' But
that is equally true in the case of devises,4 according to the majority rule.
The court argues that since the title to intestate property passes by operation of law, while the title to testate property passes by will, 5 therefore the
title to intestate property need not be assented to. The court admits that
prior to this case all such language was by way of dicta.6 By its argument the court denies the privilege of renouncing "gifts," whether beneficial
or onerous, so often alluded to in cases involving the renunciation of

devises.7

Another objection to treating intestacy like testacy is the pos-

sibility of escheat, which by English common law occurred only when the
blood of the ancestor who was the first purchaser was entirely extinguished." American statutes have greatly changed that rule; but regardless of that there would have been no escheat in the instant case because
there were other heirs who could take. Still another possible objection
would be that thus the heir would be able to defeat the letter of the succession statutes, by allowing the property of the intestate ancestor to
devolve on the other heirs in quantities greater than that provided for by
the statute. Since, however, the intestate could give the property to the
others 9 this objection seems without substance. Nevertheless, the result
of the distinction as applied in this case is sound. Renunciation involves
the doctrine of relation back, which is that the renunciation takes effect
as of the date of death, and therefore the devisee is treated as though he
never had title. 10 Thus a judgment creditor's lien would not attach and
the other heirs would take free and clear of any lien. 1 ' Therefore some
2. WILLIAMS, LAW
REAL PROPERTY (6th ed.

OF REAL PROPERTY (23rd ed.
19o2) § 1829; see note 3 infra.

I92O) 88, 89;

3 WASHBURN,
[1938] Wis. L. REv. 632.

3. Co. LiTr. *i5b, says: "But when a man dies seized of divers parcels in pos-

session, and the freehold in the law is by the law cast upon the heire. . . ." This is
cited in WATKINS, THE LAW OF DEScENTs (4th ed. 1837) 34, who paraphrases and
says, "the law casts the estate upon the heir.' Then WILLAMS, op. cit. supra note 2,

cites Watkins and agrees that the "heir at law, immediately on the decease of his ancestor, became at common law presumptively possessed, or seised in law, of all his lands.'
But then. without further citation, he goes on to say that "no disclaimer that he might
make would have any effect, though, of course, he might, as soon as he pleased, dis-

pose of the property by an ordinary conveyance." WASHBURN, supra note 2, cites
WILLIAMS and 2 BL. CoMM. *201. Blackstone's statement is that "An heir therefore

is he upon whom the law casts the estate immediately on the death of the ancestor:
and an estate, so descending to the heir, is in law called the inheritance." Blackstone
and Coke supply the major premise; Williams the conclusion; but the source of the
minor premise is unknown to this writer.
4. Greene v. King, 104 Conn. 97, 132 Atl. 411 (1926) ; In re Duffy's Estate, 228
Iowa 426, 292 N. W. 165 (i94o) ; Neeld's Estate, 38 D. & C. 381 (Pa. 1940).
5. Instant case at 732. The court then says "[inherited] title can be lost by pre-

scription, or adverse possession, or perhaps by estoppel" or parted with by ". . . intestacy, testamentary disposition, gift, contract, conveyance, and perhaps by other
ways." Greene v. King, 1O4 Conn. 97, 132 At. 411 (1926).
6. Instant case at 73o.
7. Townson v. Tickel et a[., 3 Barn. and Ald. 31 (I819), in Which Abbott, C. J.,
says at 31, "The law certainly is not so absurd as to force a man to take an estate
against his will.' Holroyd, J., at 32 says, "I think that an estate cannot be forced on
a man." Best, J., at 33 says, "It seems to be contrary to common sense to say, that
an estate should vest in a man not assenting to it. . . .. Burrit v. Silliman, 13 N.
Y. 93 (1855) ; Bouse v. Hull, x68 Md. I, 176 Atl. 645 (1935).

8.

BLACKSTONE,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW or DESCENTS (759)

68.

9. Instant case at 732.
IO. Id. at 730, and cases there cited. Brown v. O'Keefe, 3o0 U. S. 598 (1937);
In re Matthiessen's Will, 175 Misc. 466, 23 N. Y. S. 802 (1940) ; Bacon v. Barber, iio

Vt. 28o, 6 A. (2d) 9 (1939).

Ii. Instant case at 73o.
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cases deny the devisee the privilege of renouncing when creditor's rights
are involved. 12 More cases deny the privilege when the creditor relies on
apparent acceptance of the devise, or where there has been collusion between the renouncing devisee and the person who will take because of the
renunciation. 13 Thus this case, in not permitting the debtor to elect
whether or not his creditor will be able to collect, seems just.34

Habeas Corpus-Power of the Courts to Determine That the
Danger Requiring Suspension of the Writ Has Passed-After the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Territory of Hawaii was placed
under martial law, and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended
until further notice by proclamation of the Governor.' Executive and
judicial functions were vested in the military commander, 2 who continued
the suspension and limited the functions of the courts.3 Zimmerman was
detained by the military authorities by order of a military and civilian
board appointed to investigate subversive activities; no charges were made
against him. Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was sought in his behalf,
alleging that he was being illegally detained. Held, district court's denial
of petition affirmed. Ex parte Zimmerman, 132 F. (2d) 442 (I942).
Not since the Civil War has the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
been suspended by federal authorities. 4 After prolonged controversy 6 it
was decided at that time that Congress, and not the President, was authorized to suspend the writ. 6 By the Hawaiian Organic Act of i9oo,T Congress delegated this power to the Governor of the Territory in certain
cases where public safety demanded its exercise. There is no question
but that the Governor's proclamation of December 7, 1941, was authorized
by the Constitution" and the enabling act. A further and novel issue is
presented by the instant case, however, that of judicial consideration of
12. Kalt v. Youngworth, i6 Cal. (2d) 8o7, 1O8 P. (2d) 401 (194i) ; Neeld's Estate, 38 D. & C. 381 (Pa. 1940).
13. For these and other conditions see 27 A. L. R. 472 and 123 A. L. R. 26r.
14. (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1O3O.

1. This action was authorized by § 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, 31

(19oo), 48 U. S. C. A. § 532 (1928).

STAT.

153

2. It was questioned whether the Governor exceeded his authority in delegating
this power to the military commander. The court in the instant case did not make a
determination of this question.
3. On December 7, 1941, the civil courts were closed entirely; on January 27,
1942, they were authorized to resume their functions to a limited extent as agencies of
the military governor.
4. In 1861, President Lincoln ordered that the writ of habeas corpus be suspended
in respect to all persons arrested and imprisoned by military authorities. In spite of
Marshall's dictum in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 10, (18o7), that the power of
suspension was vested in Congress, Lincoln was advised by his Attorney-General that
his action was constitutional. Taney's decision to the contrary in Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9487 (C. C. Md. 1861), left the issue in a state of confusion which was resolved in 1863 by Congressional action-which vested the power of
suspension in the President, 12 STAT. 755 (1863).
5. Although precedent and a majority of contemporary authorities agreed that
the power to suspend the writ was vested in Congress alone, the proposition that
suspension was an executive act vested in the President was maintained in Horace
Binney's treatise, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. See Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the
Rebellion (i888) 3 POL. ScI. Q. 454. See also, Ex parte Field, 9 Fed. Cas. I, No. 4761
(C. C. Vt. 1862).
6. McCall v. McDowell, IS Fed. Cas. 1235, No. 8673 (C. C. Cal. 1867).
7. 31 STAT. 153 (900), 48 U. S. C. A. §532 (1928).

8. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 9, ci. 2.
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the exigency ,of the situation requiring continuation of the suspension.9
The district judge denied Zimmerman's petition, not because of the merits
of his detention, but solely because the judge felt powerless to issue the
writ in view of the order of the military governor. Judge Haney, dissenting in the Circuit Court from an affirmance of the district judge's
ruling, points out the inherent danger of a doctrine which would permit
military authorities to suspend indefinitely this constitutional guarantee of
human liberty. The guarantee would be worthless if the courts were
unable to protect the individual from the caprice of military commanders.
The majority agrees in principle with Judge Haney, holding that the
issuance of the writ in each particular case depends upon the averments
of the petition, and "facts of which the court [is] . . . required to take
judicial cognizance," 10 and concluding that the possibility of invasion of
and fifth-column activities in Hawaii warranted Zimmerman's detention.
The minority would remand the case to the lower court in order that it
might determine whether the detention was reasonably necessary for the
public welfare.11 Both deny that the courts are bound by the military
proclamation, and concur in the fundamental principle that review by the
judiciary of the circumstances requiring suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is essential to the preservation of constitutional
government.
Restitution -Equitable
Lien Granted Person Who Loaned
Money to a Supposed Owner of Real Property Expressly to Discharge a Lien Upon the Property and to Make Required RepairsDefendant lodge conveyed its clubhouse to X after it was made uninhabitable by floods. X then mortgaged the property to plaintiffs as security
for a $6,ooo loan. Approximately one-half of the proceeds was used by
X to satisfy a judgment against defendant which was a lien on the premises
and the remainder was used to pay for the majority of repairs necessary
to make the premises fit for occupancy.'
Subsequently, the conveyance
from defendant to X was adjudged void 2 and the property was recon9. The problem of indefinite suspension and access to judicial review by the civil
courts was eliminated by a provision of the Act of 1863 that persons detained be referred to a civil grand jury, and if not indicted within 2o days of their arrest, be permitted to petition the court to determine whether their detention be lawful. See Ex
parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, II5-II7 (I8%).
IO. Instant case at 445.
ii. There are interesting differences in the opinions of the district judge, and the
majority and minority in the Circuit Court, regarding the issuance of the writ. The
district judge holds that the suspension of the writ precludes the possibility of its issuance by a court; Judge Haney, in his dissent, holds that the writ issues automatically,
and that consideration of the merits of the prisoner's detention must be given on its
return. A distinction is made between suspension of the writ, and suspension of the
privilege of the writ. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 130-131 (1866). The majority
sees little purpose in attempting to analyze this distinction (instant case at 445), and
holds that the writ itself should be issued only after consideration of the petition and
its surrounding circumstances. See 14 STAT. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C. A. § 455 (928).
Only according to the view of the district judge is the suspension of the writ effective
in practice, for both decisions in the higher court hold that any prisoner may be released if the court believes that the suspensipn is unwarranted, differing only in at
what stage of the proceedings the court may so act.
i. The judgment lien amounted to $3,044.5o and the total repair bill was $3,475.oo,
of which $2,955.50 was paid from the mortgage proceeds.
2. Polish Falcons of America v. American Citizens Club for Poles of Natrona,
338 Pa. 218, I3 A. (2d) 27 (1940). The only ground was the lack of consent, necessary to convey any property, by the national organization of the Polish Falcons after
the local branch elected to comply strictly with the former's laws and regulations.
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veyed. While X held color of title, the plaintiffs received $2,000 in reduction of their mortgage. Held, equitable mortgage lien impressed on defendant's property not only for the amount of the satisfied judgment lien
which was reinstated by subrogation, but also for the amount expended to
make repairs since they were required or desired by the defendant; the
total relief, however, limited to the $4,ooo which remained unpaid on the
mortgage. Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 31 A. (2d) 718 (I943).
It is well-settled, though the cases are not unanimous," that where an
invalid or defective mortgage is given to secure a loan to another for the
express purpose ' of discharging a prior encumbrance and the money is
so used, the mortgagee is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the
original lienor whose lien was discharged provided he innocently believed
the mortgage to be valid. 5 The same rule exists where, as in the instant
case, the mortgage is void because the person giving it had only partial or
no title.6 The cases which announce this rule were properly cited by the
court as authority for reinstating the lien in favor of the plaintiffs, but it
cited no authority, except broad restitutionary principles laid down by the
Restatement of Restitution7 and made no argument for including within
the equitable lien the amount expended for necessary repairs. With the
exception of one case," not cited although it tends to support the court's
conclusion, a three party situation is a novel one, all former litigation
having involved just two parties, the landowner and the improver. At
common law, an occupant of land placed improvements thereon at his own
peril. Three reasons were given for this harsh rule: one, a person can not
make another a debtor without his consent; 9 two, any other rule would
encourage heedlessness in the examination of titles; 10 and three, it prevented officious intermeddling resulting in hardship to the owner."1 Even
today, the common law rule has been only modified. A bona fide improver
of real property, which he mistakenly believes to be his own, still can not
bring an affirmative action in law or equity 1 2 unless expressly permitted
3. See RESTATEMENT, RFsTiuTiox, RE 0RrER's NOTES (1937) § 43, and the cases
cited therein.
4. It is not clear from the record or the opinion whether the plaintiffs did lend the
money for these two express purposes, but as a practical matter, it is very improbable that they bargained for a junior lien. It is clear, however, that the main reasons
for conveying the property from defendant to X was to borrow money to pay the lien
and make repairs.

5. A long list of authorities is cited in Ingram v. Jones, 47 F. (2d) 135, 140
(1931).

See also RESTATE ExT, REsTITiFoIIN (1937) §§ 43 (c), 162.

6. Ibid. Haverford Loan and Building Association v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, i8o Pa. 522, 37 At. 179 (1897) ; Smith v. Smith, Jr., ioI Pa. Super. 545
(1931); cf. General Casmir Pulaski Building and Loan Association v. Provident
Trust Co., 338 Pa. 198, 12 A. (2d) 336 (194o).

7.

§ 4 (d), 161.

8. Calloway Bank v. Ellis, 215 Mo. App. 72, 238 S. W. 844 (1922) ; Note (1923)

23 COL. L. REv. 569. Landowner, knowing validity of the organization of the improver
school district was in question, conveyed land to the improver, who issued $4,ooo in
bonds to the plaintiff. The money was used to erect a school house on the land.
When the organization of the district was declared invalid, the conveyance was held
to be void from the beginning. Held, equitable lien granted plaintiff on the building,
not on tie whole property, on the ground that the school directors were trustees of
the funds of the plaintiff used to erect the building, and when the landowner regained
possession he did so subject to the trust.
9. RESTATEmENT, RESTrTON, REPORTER'S Nos

(1937) §43.

10. WOODWA D, QUAs-CONTRAcTS (1913) § 187; 27 Am. JuR. 262.
ii. -RESTATEMENT, RESTrTTON (1937) § 42, comment a.

12. See Note (1936) 104 A. L. R. 577.

rio
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by statute.1 However, where the improver is sued at law in ejectment
with a count for mesne profits or where an accounting for rents and profits
is sought by the owner, the improver may set-off the value of his improvements but only to the extent of the value of the rents and profits.1 ' Also,
if the owner brings an equitable action, equity will, as a condition of giving

relief, allow the improver compensation to the extent of the value of his
improvements.25
Though a modified form of the old rule still exists, the reasons which

called it into being either do not exist today or are not applicable where
owner and improver act bona fide. The first reason is unsound in the
light of modern contract law permitting assignments. The second and
third reasons do not apply where the landowner by his own conduct induces the improver's mistaken belief that he is the real owner. In view

of this, the action of the court in not extending the rule to a new situation

involving the lender, and allowing recovery in an affirmative action by him,
is entirely sound. It should be noted that on the facts recovery was allowed

only for the amount expended on improvements necessary to make the

premises habitable and which the owner required or desired. This case

again shows the virility of the broad principles of Restitution.

Trusts - Mortgage Salvage Operations-Constitutionality of
Retroactive Statute Granting Fixed Income Right to Life Beneficiary
-A testator's residuary estate in trust (income payable to wife for life,
with remainders over) included mortgages which went into default after
the testator's death. Salvage operations were commenced. The estate
acquired title to the real property prior to the enactment of a statute,' a
retrospective provision of which ordered trustees to pay ". .. net income during the salvage operation up to three per centum per annum,
regardless of principal advances for expenses of foreclosure . . . arrears
of taxes, . .. Payment [of income] shall be final . . . and not subject to recoupment from the life tenant or surcharge against the trustee.
The remaindermen attacked the constitutionality of the retroactive provisions. Held (two justices dissenting), although the statute
is retroactive it is not an unconstitutional "taking of property". In re
West's Estate, 289 N. Y. 423, 46 N. E. (2d) 5O (1943).2
13. See WOODWARD, QUAsI-CoNTRACTS (1913) 302, note I,for cases referring to
statutes. Although most states now have these statutes, commonly termed "betterment acts" or "occupying claimant acts", only under some can one recover for improvements made by him in an affirmative action against the owner.
14. Hylton v. Brown, 2 Wash. (U. S. C. C.) 165; 12 Fed. Cas. 1833 (ISo8);
McCloy v. Arnett, 47 Ark. 445, 2 S. W. 71 (1886); Taylor v. James, o9 Ga. 327,
34 S. E. 674 (x899) ; Parsons v. Moses, 16 Iowa 44o (1864) ; Jackson v. Loomis, 4
Cow. 168 (N. Y. 1825); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 8o Yerg. 59 (Tenn. 1836).
I5.Byers & McDonald v. Fowler, 12 Ark. 28 (1851); Greer v. Vaughan, 96
Ark. 524, 132 S. W. 456 (igio); Hawkins v. Brown, 8o Ky. 186 (1882); Jones,
Adm'r v. Jones, 4 Gill 87 (Md. 1846) ; Warwick v. Harvey, 158 Md. 457, 148 At. 592
(1930) ; Hicks v. Blakeman, 74 Miss. 459, 28 S6. 7 (z896) ; Freichnecht v. Meyer, 39
N. J. Eq. 551 (1885) ; Thomas v. Evans, 1o5 N. Y. 6Ol, 12 N. E. 571 (887) ; Skiles
v. Houston, rio Pa. 248, 2o Atl. 722 (1885). ,
I. N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAw, § 87-c, effective April 13, 1940 (tit 40, McKinney,
•Supp. IM4).
2. Lewis, J., dissented as he felt a vested property interest was being violated.
Loughran, J., concurred, and added that he saw no justification for disregarding the
recoupment rights of the remainderman. Lower court opinion was in 175 Misc. 1o44,
26 N. Y. S. (2d) 622 (i4i).
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The contested statutory provision only purports to make procedural
and remedial changes.3 It retains the Chapal-Otis judicial rules I governing salvage apportionment, of principal and income, of trusts created prior
discretion of
to the date of enactment. 5 Procedurally, the administrative
8
the trustee, which had heretofore guided income payments, was replaced
by a "fixed right" that guaranteed the life tenant three per centum income
(where earned) per annum on the face value of the investment. The
remedial change eliminated the remainderman's right to recoup or surcharge these payments.7 The latter provision was designed to overcome
the reluctance of the trustees to distribute any income before the completion of the usually lengthy salvage operations." There would be no
constitutional objection if the income amount found due under the final
apportionment computation always exceeded the amount of income irrevocably paid over the life of the salvage operations." Actually, this is not a
mathematical certainty.20 Neither can the trustee always make an accurate enough prognostication of the ultimate apportionment shares to
3. Supra note I,at § i7-c, subsection 2 (d).
4.Meldon v. Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. S. 172 (1898), aff'd. 167 N. Y.
573, 6o N. E. III6 (907) ; Matter of Chapal, 269 N. Y. 464, 472-3, igg N. E. 762
(1936) ; Matter of Otis, 276 N. Y. ioi, ii N. E.(2d) 556 (937). Briefly stated the
rule is: "In the capital account will be the original mortgage investment. In the income account will be the unpaid interest accrued to the date of sale upon the original
capital. The ratio established by those respective totals determines the respective interests in the net proceeds." Matter of Chapal, supra at 173.
5.The first section completely abolishes the clumsy Chapal-Otis rules as to all
trusts and mortgage investments made after the effective date of the act. Now, the
foreclosed mortgage becomes a principal asset of the estate. The life tenant immediately receives all net income earned. Expenses of foreclosure, taxes, and costs are
charged out of the principal.
6. In re Phelps, 162 Misc. 703, 7G6, 295 N. Y. S. 840 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; In re Martin, i65 Misc. 597, 612, 613, I N. Y. S. (2d) 8o (Surr. Ct. 1937). Salvage income is
usually derived from three sources: () rents received by trustee as mortgagee in
possession; (2) rents received by trustee after foreclosure as owner of the property;
(3)interest and amortization payment received by trustee upon resale, where part of
purchase price consists of a purchase money mortgage. SKELTON, The Rights of
Successive Beneficiaries in Unproductive Trust Assets Bearing Interest (1941) 15
TEmp. L. Q. 378, 396. Cf. Nirdlinger's Estate, 331 Pa. 135, 2oo Atl. 656 (1938), for
the Pennsylvania problem.
7. In re Egger, 167 Misc. 66, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 474 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; In re Brainerd,
169 Misc. 64o, 644, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 413, 417 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
8. Otherwise . . . "the life tenant of the trust must wait in the majority of the
cases for a long period of time before he becomes entitled to the payment of any income, because the present requirement that advances from principal for the expenses
of foreclosure and for arrears of taxes . . . must be paid first from the net income
of the property. . . ...Note of Commission, N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW, § i7-c.
9. If this were always true, under the previous rule the trustee could have paid in
his discretion what he is now directed to do. See Note (i937) 5 U. oF CuI. L. REv.
122, for a mathematical discussion of apportionment.
io.There was a sharp disagreement in the Surrogate Court. Surrogate Foley
in Matter of West, i75 Misc. 1044, 1052, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 622,- 632 (194), argues
. "The possibility that
that income payments will not exceed the final share. .
such a situation might result is infitesimal." However, he offers no concrete examples. Surrogate Delehanty in In re Wacht's Estate, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 871, 88o-88
(1942), gives several actual and hypothetical examples of the opposite result and
criticizes the above assumption in West's case. In the West case at the time the constitutional objection was raised the salvage operations were not yet complete, while in
the Wacht case they were. Thus it might be said that the final constitutional objection is not yet settled.
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prevent the irrevocable "overpayments"."- Therefore if the remainderman's ultimately computed share of the salvage proceeds can be considered
a vested proprietary interest there could conceivably be a "deprivation of
property without due process".' 2 However, the court denies any vested
interest.1 3 The fact is stressed that the Chapal-Otis rules '4 were only
based upon a convenient fiction, and therefore retained enough flexibility
to be procedurally reshaped by the exigencies of better trust administration.15 Nevertheless, since a fixed standard of apportionment is still
deemed to be in effect,' 6 it is an undesirable inconsistency to compel an
accounting in accordance with that standard and then completely ignore

a conceivable violation of the remainderman's "determined rights" under

it. "'
A more cogent constitutional objection has been raised since the
decision of the instant case.'
Remaindermen are required to advance
new principal to pay the expenses of the salvage operation.' 9 Thus, if
the entire original investment is ultimately lost, any irrevocable income
payments will be in effect an expropriation of the remainderman's con-

tributed capital.2 0

Although it is extremely desirable to simplify salvage

operations, it is equally essential that an equitable balance between the
i. In re Martin's Estate, I65 Misc. 597, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 8o (1937) (length of
time involved and number of errors made in calculation). In re Pelcyger's Estate, i57
Mis. 913, 285 N. Y. S. 723 (Surr. Ct. 1936) (uncertainty of computation due to great
number of items). Surrogate Foley, who so strongly upheld the new provision, once
held . . . "It may appear to be a hardship to the life tenants to withhold income,
but the necessity for safeguarding the rights of the remaindermen forbid a premature
distribution. . . . The rights of all parties must be protected. It is impossible to
treat current income as actually earned income. The hazards of a loss to the remaindermen continue. Only an actual sale and the termination thereby of the salvaging
operatiofi can establish the true facts." Matter of Otis, 158 Misc. 8o8, 817, 287 N. Y.
S. 758, 767 (Surr. Ct. 2936).
12. Instant case, 46 N. E. (2d) at 5o7, 5o8i and cases cited. See Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 283, 74 N. E. 882 (igo5) ; Matter of Pell, 17I N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789
(1902).

13. Instant case, 46 N. E. (2d) at 505. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 133, 134
(1876) ; Hurtado v. California, 11o U. S. 506, 532 (1883); N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. White,
243 U. S. i88, 198 (i916).
14. Supra note 4.
i5. Matter of Otis, 276 N. Y. ioi, xx5, ix N. E. (2d) 556, 559 (1937) ". • . a
general rule . . . cannot be attained at a bound, that no rule can be final for all
cases, and that any rule must in the end be shaped by considerations of business policy. . . . Only the sure result of time will tell how far we have succeeded."
6. Supra note i. The ascertainment of the final share is still by the Chapal-Otis
rules.
x7. See Wacht's Estate, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 871, 88o-886 (x942).
18. In re Schnitzler's Estate, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 554 (1943). The original principal was $4ooo and new principal advances amounted to $33oo. Total income during
the management period was $2040. Net proceeds of the foreclosure sale were $goo.
Trustee computed and paid $6oo interest payments under § i7-c for the previous five
years (before 2940). Remainderman claimed an apportionment credit of $4360 ($7300
-294o),
out of which $36o was additional capital he contributed. He claims no
retroactive income payments should have been' made as the entire original capital was
gone and the irrevocable payment of "income was an expropriation of his contributed
capital. (Figures approx.) N. Y. LAw J., Dec. 17, 1942, p. 1947. See alsoMatter of
Egger, 67 Misc. 66, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 474 (0938), for the stringent requirement of
trustee to apply income first to the repayment of capital advances.
ig. Ibid. See, on problem of principal advances, Matter of Otis, 276 N. Y. 2o,
ii

X. E. (2d) 556 (I937).

2o. Supra note 18.
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life tenant and the remainderman be maintained. 2 The instant statute
displays a tendency to hedge the problem, the precise outcome of which is
unforeseeable, and to that extent ignores the equitable rights of the remainderman.
21. The new provision attempts to preserve the equitable balance by providing
that any excess income over the three per centum be first applied to cover advancements from principal. Also where any balance of unpaid principal advances remained
due at the close of salvage operations, such balance was declared to be a primary lien
upon the proceeds of the sale and shall first be paid out of any cash derived. The
instant objection is where there isn't enough cash derived. Where there is a purchase
money mortgage the remainderman receives dubious satisfaction for his new capital in
the form of a primary lien for any unpaid balance of advanced principal. See also
Notes (ig4i) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rv. io8i, 1087-Io8g; (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 831,
836-842.

